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This study examines the role of resource allocation in naval
command teams. The experiment is based on the Composite Warfare
Commander - Distributed Dynamic Decisionmaking (CWC-DDD) paradigm
and investigates the impact of uncertainty in neutral/enemy
discriminability, team information structure, and leader's
involvement in resource coordination. Seven four-member teams,
consisting of military officers, used the CWC-DDD to combat a pre-
programmed air threat to a naval battle group. Results show that
increased average resource effectiveness and higher average
identification confidence lead to greater final team strength.
However, increased upward communications lead to lower final team
strength. Functional (tactical vs. non-tactical) variations in
military background have a significant impact on team performance.
Teams that are predominantly tactical develop more coherent
strategies, more effectively utilize their resources and have
better team performance. Teams that are non-tactical develop
limited strategies, assign lower confidence to their target
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INTRODUCTION
A. CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
Large scale computer systems of today have a tremendous
impact on the way modern battles are fought. Air defense
weapons can locate, identify and engage an enemy target
automatically without human intervention. Ground surveillance
radars can locate a target, designate it with a laser, and
send the target description to a fire direction computer
located miles to the rear of the front line. This fire
direction computer analyzes the target, decides the best
ammunition mix to use and picks the weapons to fire. The
message to fire is sent to a firing element located miles from
the fire direction center and the mission is fired. This
process can be completed in seconds and can be accomplished
without human intervention.
Despite this explosion of information, communication and
computer technology the human remains the focal point for
decision making in large scale systems (Kleinman and
Serfaty, 1989) .
Humans bring to a system there own ideas and
adaptability. In many cases this flexibility to adapt to
changing situations is essential to the systems proper
operation. These skills cannot at this time be programmed
into a computer system. Also in many cases it is not
politically feasible to place complete control of our
country's weapons systems in the hands of computers.
Therefore, human control is an integral part of weapons
systems employed by the United States
.
The controversy surrounding the USS Vincennes incident
points out one of the problems that remain to be solved by
systems designers. The Fogarty report concluded that "The
AEGIS combat system's performance was excellent - it
functioned as designed" (Hill, 198 9) . The report went on to
say that "mistakes made by the Vincennes CIC crew contributed
to the commanding officers belief his vessel was in danger of
attack" (Hill, 1989) . This conclusion was disputed by Martin
Hill in an article in San Diego Magazine (Hill, 1989) . He
maintains that the designers of the AEGIS system failed to
incorporate enough human engineering in their design. Without
addressing the fault of this incident it seems clear that
there exists a need to better understand the process of human
decision making as it interfaces with large information
systems
.
The AEGIS system is only one example of a large scale
military weapons system. These systems include large
databases, communications networks, automatic firing systems,
several different information gathering systems (radar, sonar,
observers, etc) and human decision makers. More importantly
these systems tend to have many human decision makers.
A characteristic feature of these systems is the presence
of a team of human decisionmakers who may be
geographically separated, but who must coordinate to share
their information, resources and activities in order to
attain their goals in what is generally a dynamic and
uncertain task environment (Kleinman and Serfaty, 1989) .
The study of the dynamics of this distributed decision making
was the purpose of the research sponsored by the Office of
Naval Research in 1985.
B. RESEARCH BY THE OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH (ONR)
The weapons of modern warfare are both accurate and
lethal. They can destroy cities, sink ships and wipe out
entire formations in seconds. The ability of modern
information systems places an enormous amount of data about
potential targets for these weapons in the hands of tactical
decisionmakers. Additionally the effects of these weapons can
be felt almost immediately. Thus, although a modern commander
has extremely destructive weapons at his disposal and massive
amounts of information about where to use these weapons,
employment decisions have to be made in seconds. Ship
commanders of today have precious few seconds to identify an
approaching aircraft and determine a course of action.
Typically in military organizations these decisions are made
by teams
.
Specifically, in the case of the battle fought by naval
ships the team is composed of the Composite Warfare
Commander (CWC) and his immediate subordinates: the Anti-Air
Warfare Commander, the Anti-surface-Warfare Commander, and the
Anti-Submarine Warfare Commander. Each of the subordinates
makes decisions and passes along information to the commander.
He makes decisions about the overall battle and passes down
information and instructions to his subordinates. Elaborate
and integrated information systems have been developed to
assist these commanders make their decisions. How commanders
make decisions in this computer assisted environment is a
growing concern in military organizations.
In order to understand the dynamics of team decisionmaking
in the Navy the Office of Naval Research has initiated the
Distributed Tactical Decision Making (DTDM) program. (Vaughn,
1990) The purpose of this study is to understand the problems
of distributed command and control. The program was initiated
to look at a wide range of methodologies . The normative -
descriptive method and lab simulation forms the basis for the
current research.
A computer based paradigm designed to simulate "real
world" Navy engagements has been developed by a research team
at the University of Connecticut and the research corporation
of Alphatech. (Kleinman and Song, 1990) The Composite
Warfare Commander - Distributed Dynamic Decisionmaking (CWC-
DDD) paradigm was the basis of an experiment conducted at the
Naval Postgraduate School during August 1991. The Resource
Allocation in Naval Command Teams (RAINCOAT) experiment was
designed to study the impact of decision making variables
using military personnel as the decision makers.
C. THE RAINCOAT EXPERIMENT
The study of distributed decision making is more then a
study of the decision making steps that individuals go through
to make decisions. In this case the sum of the parts can be
more then the whole or if things are going wrong the sum can
definitely be less then the whole. Serfaty and Kleinman
summarized the state of the art in the study of distributed
decision making at the beginning of their study as follows:
The scientific study of distributed human decision
problems has long been hindered by several objective
factors. The inherent complexity of the mathematical
formulation and solution of decentralized problems in
control, detection, data fusion, and resource allocation
theories has prevented the development efficient and
practical models that could be used as a basis to predict
actual team performance in a distributed environment. . .
.
Another hampering factor is the lack of psychological or
cognitive models of team decisionmaking behavior....
Finally the lack of comprehensive empirical data has
prevented the development of essential scientific
hypotheses related to team decisionmaking performance.
(Kleinman and Serfaty, 1989)
The recognition of these deficiencies in this field of
study and the real world need to better understand the
dynamics of team decisionmaking lead to the initiation of this
study by ONR. As stared earlier, the study concentrates on
solving the types of problems encountered in naval command
and control systems which involve distributed decisionmaking.
The scenarios developed thus far use computer simulations
modeling the composite warfare commander (CWC) doctrine
employed by naval battle groups. However, the results of the
study conducted so far have application in many different
military and civilian situations involving command and control
of distributed resources.
The RAINCOAT experiment sought to study the dynamics of
team decisionmaking as it was practiced by teams of military
officers . The Composite Warfare Commander - Distributed
Dynamic Decisionmaking (CWC - DDD) paradigm was used to
present each four person team with an abstracted military
situation in which they must respond to an enemy air attack.
The teams were presented with unidentified targets which they
must identify as enemy or neutral. Each team received at
least four hours of training prior to recorded trials of the
experiment . The goal of this training was to create expert
teams with a complete understanding of the mechanics of the
simulation. A more complete description of the experimental
procedures used in the experiment is contained in chapter III
of this document.
II. CURRENT RESEARCH
A. DEVELOPMENT OF DDD
The current Composite Warfare Commander - Distributed
Dynamic Decisionmaking (CWC - DDD) paradigm is the result of
five years of study involving the performance of model driven
basic experimental research. The development has been a joint
effort between the University of Connecticut and Alphatech
Inc. working under a grant from the Office of Naval Research.
The paradigm is designed to support empirical research and
laboratory simulation examining distributed decision making
issues in four-person hierarchial teams of naval commanders.
The players plan, coordinate, and allocate resources in a
simulated naval battle situation.
The paradigm is implemented as a computer driven
interactive game in which four team members attempt to defend
a naval battle group. The paradigm can be manipulated to
expose the decision makers to different situations of
information processing and resource allocation under different
organizational hierarchies and information structures . The
decision makers are expected to manipulate limited shareable
resources to process a variety of targets in a changing
environment . Each decisionmaker sits at a different
workstation which displays the situation as seen by each
decisionmaker. (Kleinman and Song, 1990)
B. PAST EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH IN TEAM DECISIONMAKING
1
.
Experimental Efforts in Hierarchial Team
Decisionmaking
A compilation of the results of current studies of
team decisionmaking dynamics is contained in Table 1 . This
table gives a brief summary of the experimental research that
has been conducted under the sponsorship on the Office of
Naval Research.
2 . Summary of Experimental Results
a. Hierarchical Information Processing (HIP)
This experiment was an essential part of a
coordinated study analyzing team situation assessment and
information coordination. The experiment studied situation
assessment in three-person teams . A team leader was forced to
assimilate information gained from subordinates with his own
information and opinions to determine if a contact was a
neutral or an enemy. The study was designed to look at the
effects of feedback (in the form of subordinates opinions and
confidence in their opinions) on the leaders assessment of the
situation. The experimental results supported the hypothesis
that the feedback mechanism helped to insulate teams against
the lose of a critical element of information. The results
hint that with feedback team members form a mental model of
the other decision makers and thus are able to coordinate team
actions with less communication. (Burton and Kleinman, 1990)
TABLE 1
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS IN TEAM DECISIONMAKING
EXPER VARIABLES SUBJECTS RESULTS
IMENT
HIP Information 3 Person Feedback insulates team
Feedback Teams from information losses
HRA Tempo 4 Person Leaders pool resources
Teams and positively affect
task division
INCO Information 4 Person Shared opinions among
Teams subordinates reduces
need for leader and
increases effective use
of information
HITEC Time Stress 4 Person Explicit coordination
Leader Teams is most greatly
Involvement affected by tempo
Commo Structure increases
REST Reward Structure 2 Person Differing goals in





CREST Performance 2 Person Performance feedback
Feedback Team did not greatly enhance
Expertise team performance
Overlap
ICS Information 4 Person Increase in external
structure Team load increases the
Tempo leader role. Leader can
Command Strategy suffer information
overload
Jb. Hierarchical Team Resource Allocation (HRA)
This experiment was the concluding experiment in a
series of studies looking at team resource allocation, action
selection, and team coordination. This experiment examined
the role of a leader in resource allocation problems. The
experimental goal was to determine if a teams performance
increased with the introduction of a team leader and a
hierarchical structure. The leader became the resource
allocator with the ability to force transfers of resources
among subordinates . The researchers concluded that the
introduction of a leader had a positive effect on the teams
ability to coordinate an overall pooling of resources . They
also concluded that the team was better able to coordinate
actions to process high value tasks. These studies (HIP and
HRA) served as the base of information at the beginning of the
research effort sponsored by the Office of Naval Research.
(Miao, Luh, and Kleinman, 1990)
c. Information Coordination In Human Teams (INCO)
This experiment was designed to study information
coordination in hierarchical teams. The experiment used four-
person teams. The team leader was asked to identify a contact
as friend or foe based on information passed to him by his
subordinates and on his own information. The subordinates
were asked to either identify the contact and pass this
information to the team leader or request additional
10
information. This additional information cost the team and
reduced their overall score. The team goal was to maximize
that score. The experiment found that when team members
share their opinions the team uses information more
effectively and the leader's involvement is much less
critical. The researchers also found that when the
subordinates did not share information the team performed
better with active leader. (Kleinman and others, 19 91)
d. Hierarchial Team Coordination (HITEC)
This experiment manipulated the time available for
decisions, the leader's role and the communication structure.
The experiment revealed that with a 35% increase in the game
tempo there was a 10% drop in team performance, a 25% drop in
the number of communication messages and a 10% drop in the
database (task status) updates. The communication messages
with the longest planning horizon were reduced the most. The
tasks that required more coordination were the first to be
dropped. (Wang and others, 1991)
e. The Reward Structure Experiment (REST)
This experiment measured task processing in two
person teams under an individual reward system and under a
team reward system. The different goals at the local levels
forced more explicit coordination, increased the perceived
workload, reduced the number of cooperative team actions and
lowered the overall performance. In other words the teams
11
that sought a team goal performed better at both the
individual and team levels. (Kleinman and others, 1991)
f. Conflict Resolution In Teams (CREST)
This experiment investigated conflicts in resource
sharing in two person teams . The team was confronted with a
series of air and subsurface targets/tasks. The team was
required to identify and then track each of these tasks for a
specified period of time. DM1 was required to track air tasks
while DM2 was responsible for subsurface tasks. The results
suggested performance feedback does not significantly effect
team performance. Rather it reduces the degree of
cooperative behavior in a team. The experimenters concluded:
Feedback helps correctly calibrate the mutual models that
decisionmakers hold of each other and that feedback is
filtered and interpreted more so at an individual level
then at a team level. (Nodoushani, Kleinman and Serfaty,
1989)
g. Information and Command Strategy (ICS)
This experiment was designed to investigate the
effect of different information structures and command
strategies upon resource allocation in hierarchical teams
.
Four-person teams consisting of a leader and three
subordinates are given limited resources to process tasks
within a given area. The independent variables in this
experiment were leader information, command options, and the
external load applied. The experiment showed that if a leader
has too much authority and not enough information they tend to
12
intrude into lower level processes . Additionally it showed
that too much information can lead to information overload.
(Shi, Luh and Kleinman, 1990)
C. A VIEW OF TEAM DECISIONMAKING IN COMMAND AND CONTROL
1 . The Command and Control Environment
Tasks assigned to command and control elements are
dynamic in nature; they can be diverse and completely
unpredictable. The teams that are assembled to perform
command and control are often separated geographically and
into different functional responsibilities. They make
decisions in an uncertain environment where there is not a
easily defined correct answer. Typically there is an adversary
who will work to confuse the decisionmakers of the team. In
these situations the team' s tasks can be broken into two
distinct areas . They are situation assessment and resource
management
.
Situation assessment involves a continuous analysis
and estimate of the current situation. It requires that the
team control information gathering resources and place them
in positions that will maximize their effectiveness. This
assessment requires that the team have a complete
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the resources
available to them. In a military situation this involves the
use of radars, detection devices, IFF devices to identify
friendly forces, special operation forces and many other
13
intelligence gathering forces and equipment. In business this
can involve a study of the market, surveys of potential
buyers, research of local newspapers, or even lobbying of the
government
.
Once this information is gathered it must be processed
to present a clear picture of the situation. This process
involves statistical hypothesis testing, pattern recognition
and in many cases judgement of the decisionmakers . This step
can be one of the most difficult to implement because huge
amounts of data can be collected in a very short time. The
decisionmaking team must find a way to extract the pertinent
data and assemble it into a clear picture of the situation in
time to affect a rapidly changing situation.
Resource management is the control and allocation of
an individual's resources in order to utilize them in a
effective and efficient manner to achieve organizational
goals. When allocating resources the team must remember that
the situation assessment is ongoing and the situation may be
changing. Therefore, the teams must allow for a strategic
reserve of resources to meet new demands . Teams must use
their judgement, experience, and obtained data to decide when
and where to use this reserve.
The execution of the team tasks is influenced by the
goals that the individual members of the team perceive as
their own and those of the team as a whole. The REST
experiment showed that those teams that were able to integrate
14
individual goals into the team goal attained much higher
performance levels. The leader in this case is challenged to
find common goals for his subordinates and to define them in
a way that everyone understands
.
2. Team Coordination - The G.R.I.T. View
Serfaty and Entin present a model of team
decisionmaking that defines a task as a general coordination
problem. They define coordination as the "process of managing
the overlap (interdependencies) among co-acting
decisionmakers" (Kleinman and others, 1991) . Furthermore
Serfaty and Entin maintain that this coordination is an
essential element of the team decisionmaking process
.
Serfaty and Entin define four components of
coordination: goal coordination (G) , resource coordination
(R) , information coordination (I) and task/action coordination
(T) . Goal coordination involves the team in the
reconciliation process between individual and team goals.
Resource coordination involves an accounting of available
resources; when and where they will be available. Information
coordination involves the deciphering of incoming data. It can
also be as simple as everyone agreeing on a common set of
symbols to depict actual items. Task/action coordination
involves the deconflicting of action. For example, two members
of an air defense team should not inadvertently process the
same target at the same time.
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The present line of research is investigating how this
coordination is facilitated by different environments.
Specifically, the research is looking into how coordination is
affected by the team's communication methods, the team's
information sharing, preplanned rules or procedures, and the
team's hierarchial structure.
3 . Summary of Conclusions from Current Research
a. Team Limitations and Biases
Strategies developed by decisionmakers have a short
planning horizon; two to three stages of decisionmaking appear
to be the limit . Decision strategies developed by teams tend
to be different then strategies developed by individuals.
Individual decisionmakers tend to believe that their judgement
of the situation is the best and that their task is the most
important. When possible, teams tend to overuse communication
channels in an attempt to reduce future uncertainty. This is
particularly true when the workload is light. Finally, teams
tend to underestimate their ability to coordinate implicitly.
(Wang, Serfaty, Luh and Kleinman, 1991)
Jb. Team Adaptation to Time Stress
The level of stress that a team encounters
influences the their performance in different ways. As the
external load began to increase the teams prioritized their
tasks and eliminated those with a low priority (Miao, Luh and
Kleinman, 1990) . At this stage the teams seemed to prefer
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processed information to raw data. Additionally, the amount
of communication among the team members tended to decrease
sharply. Decisionmakers shrank their planning cycle and
eliminated tasks that required extensive coordination.
Although the teams were beginning to encounter problems, the
level of performance usually remained fairly high.
As the external load increased even further the
teams performance decreased significantly. The teams tended
to disintegrate into a collection of individual decisionmakers
instead of a cohesive team. The load was spread unequally in
order to reduce the amount of coordination required between
members of the team. This is unfortunate for the
decisionmaker who happens to be in the busy sector.
Additionally, the error rate showed a significant increase as
team performance decreased. (Wang and others, 1991)
c. Communication Strategy
As the tempo of the external load increased from a
low tempo to a moderate tempo the teams explicit coordination
and resource transfer rates tended to increase. However, as
the tempo increased to a high rate, the explicit coordination
dropped to a rate significantly lower then the low tempo rate.
The researchers concluded that the high tempo forced the team
members to behave more like individual decisionmakers then as
a coordinated team. (Wang and others, 1991)
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d. Team Leader
The role of the team leader diminishes as the
subordinates are provided with communication methods for cross
coordination or if information sources are shared throughout
the team. The team leader is affected by the type and amount
of information received. The team leaders authority must be
consistent with the information that is available. Blanket
authority without information causes the team leader to
intrude on the decisionmaking of his/her subordinates.
However, too much information can quickly overload the team
leader and render decisionmaking impossible. (Shi, Luh and
Kleinman, 1990) Leaders at different levels tended to hold
different perceptions of the team problem. These perceptions
caused internal conflict in the team and forced differing
coordination methods at the different hierarchial levels in
the team. (Wang and others, 1991)
4 . Research Questions
The goal of the RAINCOAT experiment is to provide
further information into the dynamics of team decisionmaking
as practiced by teams of military decisionmakers. The research
question is : what is the impact of uncertainty, differing
information flows and different leader roles on team




The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of
certainty of target identification, the command structure, and
the role of the leader on team performance, team strategy, and
team coordination. A double 2x2 repeated-measures within-
subject design was used. As Figure 1 indicates the design
allows us to examine three main effects (U, I, and L) and two
interaction effects (U x I and I x L)
.
1 . Independent Variables
The independent variables for this study were (1)
Neutral/Enemy Discriminability Uncertainty (2) Team
Information Structure and (3) Leader's Involvement in Resource
Coordination. Neutral/Enemy Discriminability Uncertainty (U)
was established by having all enemy aircraft fly at either 0.4
kft (low uncertainty) or . 5 kft (high uncertainty) . In both
the low and high uncertainty environments neutral aircraft
flew at 0.7 kft. In both cases sensor noise caused readings
to fluctuate with a standard deviation of 0.2 kft and the
scale was truncated at two standard deviations. So, for
example, 100% of enemy aircraft in a low uncertainty situation
would have readings from 0.0 to 0.8 while neutral aircraft in
the same situation would have readings from 0.3 to 1.1. These
19








Figure 1 - Experimental Design
numbers show that readings from . 3 to . 8 could be either
enemy or neutral showing how uncertainty is built into the
study (see Figure 2)
.
Team Information Structure (I) was termed either
Centralized or Decentralized. The leader's information set
always included all targets (enemy, neutral, and
unidentified) . This independent variable pertains only to the
subordinates' information structure. In a Decentralized
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Figure 2 - Neutral /Enemy Discriminability Uncertainty
in their own area of responsibility (including own overlap
areas) only. In a Centralized environment the subordinates'
information set includes targets in their own area of
responsibility and any enemy identified as such in all three
areas
.
Leader Involvement in Resource Coordination (L) was
termed either Active or Passive. In an Active leader role,
the leader was involved in situation assessment and enemy
attack determination, and was allowed to take an active part
in resource coordination and platform transfer among the
21
subordinates (including advice on transfers and forced
transfers)
.
In a Passive leader role the leader was only involved
in situation assessment and enemy attack determination, but
was not allowed to take part in resource coordination and
platform transfer among the subordinates.
2 . Raincoat Counter-Balanced Design
Six basic scenarios were designed, with an embedded
two-level variable: team coordination requirement. Depending
on the direction of the main enemy attack, either resource or
task coordination is being stressed. The scenarios were
randomized across teams and experimental conditions in such a
way that every Exam was treated once by each of the six
experimental conditions and by each scenario once. Three of
these scenarios stressed resource coordination by placing the
primary attack in the middle of a DM' s own area of
responsibility (each DM was given one primary attack)
.
Resource coordination requires the DM to basically work on
his/her own and request additional resources as required. The
other three scenarios stressed task/action coordination by
placing the primary attack in an overlapping sector (each
overlap sector was given one primary attack) . Task/action
coordination requires two adjacent DM' s to work together in
deciding who is going to work on which target (s) . Table 2









11 12 13 21 22 23
111 A B/G D C E F
121 F D C E A B/G
211 E F B/G D C A
221 D E A F B/G C
212 C A F B/G D E
222 B/G C E A F D
B . SUBJECTS
Subjects for the experiment consisted of 27 active duty
military officers and one civilian employee of the National
Security Agency enrolled in the Command, Control, and
Communications (C 3 curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey California. Five of the subjects were female
23
and 23 male. The subjects were allowed to freely divide into
seven teams of four members each. Within each group, one
person was picked to be the leader (DM0) and the other members
played the roles of three subordinate decisionmakers (DM1,
DM2, and DM3) . During the training and practice sessions the
team members were allowed to freely change positions to get a
feel for what was required of each position. Once the real
experimental sessions began changing of positions was
prohibited. The level of experience was controlled by using
the Composite Warfare Commander - Distributed Dynamic
Decisionmaking (CWC-DDD) experimental paradigm. None of the
subjects had previously used the CWC-DDD simulation.
C . APPARATUS
In our experiment the CWC-DDD simulation software was set-
up to run on a Sun Microsystems SPARC 1+ server with four
SPARCstation SLC diskless workstations, each having a
monochrome monitor and an optical mouse, all linked together
through an ethernet . The software was written to run under
SunOS and the Sunview operating environment. Team members
participated in the simulation using the workstations while
the server ran the simulation. The network and experiment
were in a room where noise was kept to a minimum and
distractions that might influence the outcomes were minimized.




The tasks carried out by the subjects were conducted using
the CWC-DDD experimental paradigm. The CWC-DDD simulation
creates a tactical environment that replicates, with a
considerable level of abstraction, decisionmaking problems
encountered by commanders in naval battle groups . It was
developed by a research team at the University of Connecticut
for use in the CREST and ICS experiments to provide a rather
abstracted military environment . Certain features of the CWC-
DDD simulation were greatly simplified or even removed to
allow us to focus on a particular aspect of the team
decisionmaking process for purposes of the RAINCOAT (Resource
Allocation In Naval Command Teams) experiment.
1 . Problem Domain
The problem domain constructed for the RAINCOAT
experiment consisted of three parts:
• Anti-Air Problem (Inner/Outer Air Battle) . The objective
of the blue team is to defend a defined area around an
aircraft carrier against an orange air threat
.
• Four-Person Blue Teams. A leader (Anti-Air Warfare
Commander - DM0) and three subordinates (DM1, DM2, and
DM3) responsible for three geographical sectors (see
Figure 3) .
• Orange Attack Scenario is pre-programmed in the simulation
(there were six pre-programmed scenarios used for this
experiment)
. Targets are maneuvering in the theater of
operations. However, the targets are not reactive to the
actions of the blue team.
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2 . Phases
Each experimental session is broken down into three
phases: Planning (PL), Situation Assessment (SA) , and Threat
Prosecution (TP) .
a. Planning (PL) Phase
During the PL phase the blue team receives a
detailed description of their own resource capabilities (how
many and what type of platforms and subplatforms)
,
their
relative emplacement in future operations, a brief
intelligence assessment of the overall situation (whether the
enemy is expected to attack) , and a general description of the
probable enemy attack tactics (that the enemy will use a
primary and diversionary attack path) . The job of the blue
team is to prepare a coordinated defense plan based on this
preliminary information, answer a few questionnaires,
preposition their platforms, and wait for the start of the SA
phase
.
Jb. Situation Assessment (SA) Phase
During the SA phase the job of the subordinates is
to allocate their sensors (platforms and subplatforms) and to
take sensor readings in order to make a neutral or enemy
assessment on a target-by-target basis, in their sector of
responsibility. Figure 3 presents an example situational
display for a subordinate commander showing the division of
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Figure 3 - Typical Screen
typical CWC—DDD simulation. In the next step the subordinates
report their assessment to the team leader (interpret their
sensor readings as either enemy or neutral, what size or
damage-inducing potential the target has, and how confident
they are in their decision) . The job of the leader is to
request more information on a particular target if necessary
and once satisfied with the accuracy of all subordinates'
reports, to look at the global situation and make an attack
determination. He should decide if the blue forces are under
attack, where is the main avenue of attack or threat axis (in
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what sector) , where is the eventual secondary or diversionary
attack, and when the blue team should start threat prosecution
for the purpose of self-defense.
c. Throat Prosecution (TP) Phase
During the TP phase the job of the subordinates is
to allocate their subplatforms to engage the threat as defined
by the leader. Each subplatform has a radius of lethality
where an attack can be undertaken with a certain probability
of kill. To do their job most effectively they must transfer
resources (subplatforms) to the heaviest attack area and under
the responsibility of that area commander. They may have to
cooperate on some defense missions by pooling their resources
together against a certain threat type. The job of the team
leader is to ensure that the main goal of defending the
carrier is achieved. To do so, he may have to enforce
resource transfer among subordinates, set priorities on
threats, and coordinate the subordinate's actions. A certain
number of strength points are taken away from the team when a
threat penetrates the inner defense zone, the blue team
attacks a neutral, or the blue team does not allocate the
proper amount of resources when attacking an enemy target
.
The objective of the team is to maximize the number of
strength points remaining at the end of a scenario. At the
completion of the trial a subjective workload assessment is
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completed by each member of the team and finally a post-
engagement questionnaire is distributed to team members.
E. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
Initial exposure to the experiment was accomplished
through a briefing which covered very general characteristics
of the simulation. Scheduling and other coordination was
accomplished during this session so that each team would be
able to provide a minimum of two hours per week for five
consecutive weeks to the experiment . Each team was required
to provide a minimum of ten hours to the experiment, four
hours for training/practice and six hours for actual data
collection
.
1 . Training and Practice Sessions
The first part of team training involved a walk
through using hard copy screen dumps from an actual session.
This method was used to explain each component of the screen
to all members simultaneously. Different screen dumps showed
various stages of the scenario and each window that a DM might
see was fully explained. This portion of the first session
lasted from 45-60 minutes. After completion of the walk
through, each team member was seated at a station and the
simulation was started (using training scenarios) . During
this first (and all subsequent practice sessions) run of the
simulation two tutors were present to show different
techniques and answer any questions posed by the subjects.
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This part of the session lasted 35 minutes. Finally, to
complete the first two hours of training, a practice session
was started and the team was allowed to play freely, asking
questions as necessary and having particular points stressed
by the tutors. During the training/practice sessions team
members were allowed to freely discuss anything about the
simulation. The second training/practice session normally
started with a review of the previous session. The remainder
of the session consisted of running consecutive trials until
the two hours was completed. By this point, most teams were
confident in their ability to continue on with the data
collection sessions. However, one team asked for another
training session to work on some areas with which they were
having trouble
.
2 . Data Collection Sessions
These sessions started out with briefings on the
various parameters of the current session and pre-engagement
questionnaires. During these trials no talking was allowed
between DM' s except through communications provided in the
simulation. Each trial lasted approximately 35 minutes;
however, 60 minutes were allotted for pre- and post-engagement
questionnaires, a short break between trials, and any strategy
discussions that the team conducted during the planning phase.




3. Post Data Collection
After completion of all data collection sessions a
short demographic questionnaire was completed by each subject
and team strategies were discussed.
F. DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The dependent variables for this experiment were collected
in order to capture the team behavior during each experimental
scenario. They can be divided into three categories:
Performance, Strategy, and Coordination.
1 . Team Performance Measures
Final Team Strength [%] . This is the most global measure
of team performance. It is the one that each team
attempts to maximize. At the start of the scenario
(time=0) , the team is given an initial strength S0f
representing some aggregate value of the defensive
strength of the battle group. As the battle progresses,
the team strength is being reduced by the damage caused by
enemy forces as well as by mistakes made by the blue team,
such as attacking a neutral task. The relative team
strength at any time is computed as:
S -AS
S
where AS is the loss at time t . This loss is a function
of the number of threats that penetrated the inner
defense, the number of neutral tasks attacked by the blue
force, and the number of enemy targets that were attacked
with inadequate resources by blue forces
.
• Number of False Alarms [] . This reflects a Type II
misclassification error (target identified as enemy when
it is really neutral)
.
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• Number of Correct Enemy Identifications []
• Number of Misdetections [] . This reflects a Type I
misclassification error (target identified as neutral
when it is really enemy)
.
• Number of Correct Neutral Identifications [].
• Correct Enemy Classification Ratio [%] . This measure is
computed as the ratio of correctly classified enemies
(Low, Medium, and High damage-producing capability) to the
total number of enemy targets that are identified as such.
• Number of Targets Unidentified []
• Correct Primary Attack Determination [0/1] . If the leader
correctly identifies the axis of the primary attack P ( + /-
1 sector) , then this variable takes a value of 1,
otherwise it is 0.
• Correct Diversionary Attack Determination [0/1] . If the
leader correctly identifies the axis of the diversionary
attack D (+/- 1 sector) , then this variable takes a value
of 1, otherwise it is 0.
Primary/Diversionary Attack Confusion [0/1]. If the
leader incorrectly determines the axis of the primary
attack p on the true diversionary attack D axis ( + /- 1
sector)
,
then this variable takes a value of 1, otherwise
it is .
• Diversionary/Primary Attack Confusion [0/1] . If the
leader incorrectly determines the axis of the diversionary
attack D on the true primary attack axis P (+/- 1 sector)
,
then this variable takes a value of 1, otherwise it is 0.
• Average Attack Score on Enemy Targets [points] . This
score is the function of the value of the enemy target
(damage-inducing potential) and the amount of attack
resources used on the target. For enemy target k, the
score is computed as
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SCK-VALK*REFKf
where VAL is the target value (Low=l-4, Medium=4-6, and
High=6-8) , and REF is the resource effectiveness for
target k . REF is defined in Average Resource
Effectiveness
.
• Total Number of Attacks of Enemy Targets []
.
• Number of Attacks of Enemy Targets in the Primary (P)
Attack Axis []
.
• Number of Attacks of Enemy Targets in the Diversionary (D)
Attack Axis [ ]
• Total Leakage [%] . Number of true Enemy targets that
penetrated the Inner Defense Zone/Total number of threats.
• Total Leakage in (P) [%]
.
• Total Leakage in (D) [%]
• Total Number of Attacks of Decoys []
.
• Total Number of Attacks of Neutrals []
.
• Number of Attacks on Low Threat Targets []
.
• Number of Attacks on Medium Threat Targets []
.
• Number of Attacks on High Threat Targets []
.
2 . Team Strategy Measures
• Average Resource Effectiveness (AREF) [%] . An enemy
target requires the allocation of a pre-determined amount
of resources (weapons) to be attacked with maximum
effectiveness (i.e., completely destroyed) . The amount of
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required resources is a function of the damage—producing
capability of the target. This capability is indicated by
the second attribute of the target, i.e., its value
(Low=2-4, Medium=4-6, and High=6-8) . Taking into account
that each X subplatform contains 1 resource, and each Y
subplatform contains 2 resources, Table 3 describes the











IX or 1Y 2X or 1Y 3X or 1X+1Y
The resource effectiveness of an attack on an enemy target
is computed as the square of the ratio of resources
allocated/resources required. For example, suppose that
a high-valued enemy has been identified. Three resources
are required for a complete kill. If a DM allocates IX +
1Y platforms (three resources) , the resource effectiveness
(REF) is (3/3) 2=100%. If a DM allocates only 1Y platform
(two resources), the REF is (2/3) 2=44%. There is no bonus
or penalty for an over-allocation of resources. For
instance if, in the case described above, the DM allocates
4X platforms when only three are required, the REF will
still be 100%. The AREF is computed as the average of all
REF on attacks on enemy aircraft by the blue team.
AREF on Low Threat targets [%]
.
AREF on Medium Threat Targets [%]
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• AREF on High Threat Targets [%]
.
• Number of Attacks by Platforms []
• Average Number of Platforms used for Identification []
Averaged across all targets identified.
• Average Team Latency [sec] . Delay between the appearance
of a target and the very first team action on that target
(communication, identification, or attack) . When averaged
across all targets, it represents a measure of the overall
reaction time of the team.
• Average Identification Delay [sec] . Delay between the
appearance of a target and the first team identification
of that target. Averaged across all tasks identified by
the team.
• Time of First Primary (P) Attack Determination [sec]
• Time of First Diversionary (D) Attack Determination
[sec] .
• Number of Attack Determinations []
.
• Ratio of Targets Identified as Enemy but not Attacked [%]
• Number of Direct Attacks by Team Leader []
.
• Average Attack Location [nm] . Distance between an attack
location and the center of the battle group (A/C)
.
Averaged across all tasks attacked by the team.
• Average Identification Confidence []




3 . Team Coordination Measures
Total Communication Rate [msg/min] . Total team
communication traffic average over the length of the
scenario. (Note: each broadcast counts as three
messages) .
• Number of Messages per Target Attacked []
• Number of Platform Requests [] .
• Number of Advices [] . Number of "advise transfer"
messages issued by the leader to transfer a platform
between subordinates
.
• Vertical Downward Communication []. Number of messages
issued by the leader to the subordinates.
• Vertical Upward Communications []. Number of messages
issued by the subordinates to the leader.
• Horizontal Communication [] . Number of messages issued by
a subordinate to another subordinate.
• Number of Platform Transfers by Subordinates []
.
• Number of Platform Transfers by the Leader []
.
• Number of Wasted Attacks [] . A wasted attack may occur in
the overlap sectors if a DM attempts to attack a target
already under attack by another DM. This measure is
indicative of a lack of planning and attack coordination





Due to the large quantity of dependent variables in the
data set it was necessary to reduce the number to a more
manageable size. The experiment began with 4 9 dependent
variables and through heuristic methods was reduced to 15.
The original data set contained several dependent variables
that were subsets of other dependent variables. These subsets
provided redundant information that was of limited value and
were eliminated from further consideration. The values of
several other dependent variables were discovered to depend
upon the experimental design and were also eliminated. An
examination of the means of the remaining variables showed
that the values of several of the variables changed little
regardless of the independent conditions and were removed from
consideration. Two variables were not considered because
their values were affected by mechanical or software error.
Table 4 shows the dependent variables that remained, what
they represented, their means, and their standard deviations.
The data that remained were analyzed using an univariate
analysis of variance (ANOVA) computed using the General Linear





FINAL DEPENDENT VARIABLE LIST
NUMBER DEFINITION MEAN STDEV
1 Final Team Strength 64.67 21.84
2 Number of False Alarms 5.12 3.30
5
Number of Correct Neutral Identifications 19.71 3.27
6 Correct Enemy Classification Ratio 0.80 0.16
24 Average Resource Effectiveness 0.88 0.10
30 Average Team Latency [sec] 278.84 81.72
32 Time of First P Attack Determination [sec] 962.07 222.42
38 Average ID Confidence 1.92 0.26
39 Average Number of ID Actions per Task
Identified
2.68 0.82
40 Total Communication Rate 0. 67 0.48
41 Number of Messages per Target Attacked 1.69 1.36
44 Vertical Downward Communication 9.12 12.60
45 Vertical Upward Communications 4.05 4.19
46 Horizontal Communications 10.24 6.98
47 Number of Platform Transfers by Subordinates 1.95 1.85
The ANOVA procedure produces a value, p, which represents
the probability of making an error in claiming that a
dependent variable is affected by different levels of an
independent variable. A value of p < 0.05 is considered
significant. A value of 0.05 < p < 0.1 is considered
marginally significant. The ANOVA method also identifies
significant interactions between two or more independent
variables. (Miao, Luh and Kleinman, 1990)
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B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Two different approaches were taken in conducting the
ANOVA. The first approach considers between cell interactions
(see figure 1) , while the second approach involves between
team comparisons. A third approach was conducted using
correlation techniques and an analysis of the processes which
affected team performance
.
1 . Between Cells Analysis
a. Summary Statistics
Summary statistics (means and standard deviations)
for each of the 15 dependent variables are given in table 5.
The highest final team strength were attained in situations
with an active leader and low uncertainty. In situations with
an active leader and high uncertainty there was a significant
difference in final team strength between a decentralized
information structure and a centralized information structure
(54.00 vs. 63.29) (See figure 4). Teams in the former
situation (high uncertainty, decentralized information
structure, and active leader cell) also showed considerably
less team latency when the information structure was
decentralized as opposed to all other cells. Under conditions
of high uncertainty the first primary attack determination
took longer when the leader was passive and the information
structure was decentralized (1063.43 sec) or if the leader
39
TABLE 5






























































































































































































was active and the information structure was centralized
(1003.43 sec) as opposed to a passive leader with a
centralized information structure (848.14 sec) or an active
leader with decentralized information structure (887.29
sec) (See figure 5) . Under high uncertainty, with an active
leader more identification actions were taken per task with
centralized information than with decentralized information;
however, with a passive leader more identification actions
were taken per task with decentralized information than with




























Figure 4 - Final Team Strength
and high uncertainty there were significantly more vertical
communications in decentralized (7.43) as opposed to
centralized (3.00) information structures. With an active
leader there were more horizontal communications with
centralized information than with decentralized information;
however, with a passive leader there were more horizontal
communications with decentralized information than with
centralized information (See figure 7)
.
Jb. Analysis of Variance
Table 6 summarizes the results of the univariate
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the selected dependent
variables
. There was a difference in the number of false
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Figure 5 — Time of First Primary Attack Determination
alarms found in each of the cells at the . 0234 significance
level . This shows that in low uncertainty situations the
number of false alarms is markedly less than in high
uncertainty situations . Supporting the same hypothesis is the
fact that the number of correct neutral identifications was
significant at 0.0196 significance level. This shows that in
low uncertainty situations teams were better able to identify
neutral tasks than in high uncertainty situations regardless
of the information structure or leader role. Average
identification confidence was found to be significant at the
0.0020 level. This shows that in low uncertainty situations
teams had higher average identification confidence than in
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Figure 6 - Average ID Actions per Task Identified
high uncertainty situations. The dependent variables which
showed significance in the between cells analysis all measured
an impact of uncertainty. Dependent variables measuring
impacts of the other independent variables did not show
significance as measured by the ANOVA' s . This supports the
hypothesis that only uncertainty has a significantly different
impact between the cells
.
c. Team Composition Summary
Table 7 shows the composition of each team
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Figure 7 - Horizontal Communication
service, branch of service, specialty, team average time-in-
service, tactical rating, and strategy rating. Tactical
rating is a percentage of the team members that are trained to
serve in tactical positions . This includes Surface Warfare
Officer (SWO) , Naval Flight Officer (NFO) , Air Defense
Artillery Officer (ADA) , Pilot/Electronic Warfare Officer
(EW) , Anti-Air Warfare Officer (AAW) , and Infantry Officer
(INF) . The non-tactical positions included Computer Related




ANOVA - BETWEEN CELLS ANALYSIS
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
SUM OF SQUARES F VALUE Pr > F
1 1608.76 0.65 0.6668
2 130.97 2.99 0.0234
5 132.28 3.11 0.0196
6 0.03 0.26 0. 9309
24 0.02 0.42 0.8332
30 6333.03 0.17 0.9719
32 225045.93 0.90 0.4926
38 1.09 4.73 0.0020
39 0.63 0.17 0.9733
40 0.98 0.83 0.5382
41 7. 98 0.84 0.5271
44 395.26 0.47 0.7990
45 45.33 0.48 0.7860
46 163.33 0.64 0.6703
Instructor (INST) , and Public Affairs Officer (PAO) . The
strategy rating information was gathered through team
debriefings following their last experimental trial . Each
team was asked to describe their strategy for handling overlap
areas, transferring resources, and assigning confidence levels
to identified tasks. Some of the teams had a coherent
strategy while others did not.
d. Summary Statistics
Summary statistics (means and standard deviations)





TEAM DM # TIME BRANCH PRIMARY
TRAINING
AVG TIME TACTICAL STRATEG
Y
A 6.5 USN SWO 10.6 50% YES
1 6 USN SWO
2 13 USAF COMP
3 17 USAF COMP
B 8 USAF COMMS 10.3 50% NO
1 12 USN NFO
2 5 USN SWO
3 16 USAF COMMS
C 5.75 USMC ADA 6.1 75% YES
1 6 USN EW
2 5 USAF COMP
3 7.5 USN AAW
D 7 USN INST 9.0 0% NO
1 16 USAF COMMS
2 7 USAF COMMS
3 6 USAF COMMS
E 11 USN NFO/AAW 10.4 100% YES
1 16 USMC INF
2 6.5 USN SWO
3 8 USA INF
F 6 USN SWO 6.75 75% YES
1 7 USAF COMMS
2 6 USN SWO
3 8 USN SWO
G 6 NSA COMMS 6.1 50% NO
1 4 USN SWO
2 5.5 USN SWO
3 9 USN PAO
The three teams with high tactical ratings (75%+) showed
significantly higher final team strength, higher correct enemy
classification ratios, and better average resource
effectiveness. The two teams with the lowest final team
strength (A and D) had poor resource effectiveness, lower
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average identification confidence levels, and significantly
more vertical upward communications.
e. Analysis of Variance
Table 9 summarizes the results of the univariate
analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the selected dependent
variables. In the between teams analysis all of the selected
dependant variable ANOVA' s showed a significance level less
than 0.05. This shows that significant differences existed
between each of the teams' performance, strategy, and
communication methods
.
2 . Process Analysis
As was stated before in Chapter III the dependent
variables were broken into three categories; Measures of
Performance, Measures of Strategy, and Measures of
Communication. Final Team Strength, Number of False Alarms,
Number of Correct Neutral Identifications, Correct Enemy
Classification Ratio, and Average Resource Effectiveness are
all measures of performance. Average Team Latency, Time of
First Primary Attack Determination, Average Identification
Confidence, and Average number of ID Actions per Task
Identified are all measures of strategy. Total Communication
Rate, Number of Messages per Target Attacked, Vertical
Downward Communication, Vertical Upward Communication, and
47
TABLE 8









































































































































































































Horizontal Communication are all measures of communication.
A correlation analysis was performed using the correlation
procedures in the SAS statistical analysis software which
produced a correlation matrix showing interactions between the
variables (SAS Institute Incorporated, 1988) .
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TABLE 9
ANOVA - BETWEEN TEAMS ANALYSIS
DVAR SUM OF SQUARES F VALUE Pr > F
1 10248.33 6.42 0.0001
2 135.23 2.54 0.0382
5 146.90 2.94 0.0199
6 0.74 16.67 0.0001
24 0.20 7.15 0.0001
30 228545. 90 29.44 0.0001
32 1205442.62 8.55 0.0001
38 1.03 3.45 0.0088
39 26.45 107.54 0.0001
40 4.29 4.81 0.0011
41 26.55 3.13 0.0146
44 3703.90 7.72 0.0001
45 406.90 7.58 0.0001
46 605.95 2.54 0.0382
An analysis of the correlation matrix showed a
moderate negative correlation (-0.35, P< 0.0217) showing that
increased Vertical Upward Communications leads to decreased
Average ID Confidence. Furthermore, there exists a moderate
correlation (0.42, P<0.0057) indicating that decreased Average
ID Confidence resulted in reduced Average Resource
Effectiveness. Additionally, there is a strong correlation
(0.82, P<0.0001) demonstrating that reduced Average Resource
Effectiveness caused a lower Final Team Strength. This




Further analysis of the correlation matrix
demonstrated that a moderate correlation (0.36, P<0.0197)
existed showing that an increase in the Average Number of ID
Actions per Task Identified led to an increase in the Average
ID Confidence level. Also, a there was a moderate correlation
(0.42, P<0.0057) indicating that an increase in the Average ID
Confidence level caused an increase in the Average Resource
Effectiveness. As indicated before increased Average Resource
Effectiveness results in higher Final Team Strength. This
analysis is also supported by the summary statistics of the
between teams analysis
.
A moderate negative correlation (-0.41, P<0.0073)
indicates a decrease in the Vertical Upward Communication led
to an increase in the Average Number of ID Actions per Task
Identified. A further moderate correlation exists (0.45,
P<0.0027) demonstrating that an increase in the Average Number
of ID Actions per Task Identified led to an increase in the
Final Team Strength.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A. GOAL
The goal of this study was to determine the impact of (1)
Neutral/Enemy discriminability uncertainty, (2) Team
information structure, and (3) Leader's involvement in
resource coordination upon four person teams consisting of
military decisionmakers.
B. CONCLUSIONS OF STUDY
Three approaches were taken in the analysis of the
experimental results; between cells analysis, between teams
analysis, and an analysis of the processes that affected team
performance. The between cells analysis showed that of the
three independent variables the level of uncertainty had the
most significant impact on team performance. With an active
leader there was an increase in Horizontal Communications,
Average ID Actions per Task, and Time of First Primary Attack
Determination when moving from a decentralized information
structure to a centralized information structure. The
opposite was true when the leader was passive. These
variables showed a decrease when moving from a decentralized
information structure to a centralized information structure.
The ANOVA only showed three dependent variables to be
significant; Number of False Alarms, Number of Correct Neutral
51
Identifications, and the Average ID Confidence. The first two
of these are very closely related while the third is closely
related to the level of uncertainty.
The between teams analysis shows that the level of
tactical training within a team directly influenced the
performance of that team. Teams with a more tactical
background developed a more coherent team strategy. Average
time-in-service appeared to have little or no impact on team
performance. The two teams with the lowest Final Team
Strength demonstrated poor resource effectiveness, lower
confidence levels, and significantly more upward
communication
.
The process analysis demonstrated an association between
communication methods, team strategy, and team performance.
There were more significant correlations between strategy
measures and performance measures than communication measures
and performance measures, although the communication measures
were highly correlated to each other. This analysis showed
that the subordinates who tried to pass a large amount of
information up the chain of command tended to assign that
information much lower confidence levels causing less
effective use of resources by the team and subsequently lower
team strength. Conversely, the subordinates who passed less
information up the chain-of-command were able to take more
sensor readings and attained a higher team strength.
Additionally, teams which took multiple sensor readings on
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unidentified targets were able to assign a higher confidence
level to each task leading to better resource effectiveness
and finally a higher final team strength.
C. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
There were five primary limitations in the conduct of this
experiment. First, communications were severely limited.
Each decisionmaker was limited to a pre-established set of
messages which was very restrictive. A recommendation would
be to include either plain-text messages that can be entered
from the keyboard or to establish voice communications
.
Second, the workspace was very confined and the
decisionmakers were not adequately separated from each other.
A recommendation would be to ensure physical separation of all
decisionmakers
.
Third, during the conduct of the experiment it was
discovered that sometimes the leader was unable to engage
targets due to a problem in the software. After several
discussions with the primary programmer it was decided that
the software repair would have to wait until after the
conclusion of this experiment. This led to removing one of
the dependent variables from the data set (DVAR 36 - Number of
Direct Attacks by Team Leader)
.
Fourth, the hardware that was used for this experiment
included monochrome monitors . The use of color monitors would
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enhance the decisionmakers ability to decipher information
from the screen.
Fifth, decisionmakers were unable to filter the
information presented on the screen. The ability to look at
only targets identified as enemy or neutral would reduce
clutter and increase readability leading to less confusion.
This is especially true for the team leader.
Several follow-on studies are suggested by the results
provided here. First, a study of the impact of implicit
coordination, as a strategy, on communications and team
performance . In the RAINCOAT experiment it became evident
that some of the teams developed very comprehensive team
strategies. They developed rules for assigning confidence
levels to task identifications, resource allocation in the
overlap areas and, types of communication methods. The impact
of these rules showed up in the RAINCOAT experiment as
improved team performance . Future studies could concentrate
on analyzing this implicit coordination as an independent
variable in order to quantify its impact.
Another enhancement to this study would be to move the
decisionmakers into a more tactical setting and introduce
external noise as an added pressure. The experiment was
conducted in a quiet office setting. The decisionmakers were
isolated from external interference and even prevented from
talking to each other. Future studies could focus on
introducing noise into the environment in order to analyze its
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impact on the decisionmaking process. This would move the
paradigm closer to a real life setting.
Third, subjective workload assessment data was gathered
for this experiment . An analysis should be done to determine
the impact of perceived workload on team performance. Data
exists for each decisionmaker and for each team.
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